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Death Becomes the State:
The Death Penalty in New York State-
Past, Present and Future
Deborah L. Heller*
Introduction
The death penalty is one of the oldest penalties available
for the punishment of crimes. It has been utilized throughout
this country since its inception. The death penalty in New York
State has been through many incarnations throughout time,
ranging from active use to moratoriums.' After years without a
death penalty statute, New York enacted one in 1995.2 In 2004,
the New York State Court of Appeals ruled that the New York
death penalty statute could not be applied as written because
the deadlock instruction 3 was unconstitutional. 4 Since that
time, New York has been without a valid death penalty statute,
and the death sentences of all but one man have been com-
muted to life in prison.5 This Comment focuses on the history,
present and possible future of the death penalty in New York
State and the fate of the sole person left on death row.
Section I outlines the history of the death penalty in New
York State. The death penalty has undergone several changes
as New York itself has changed. Section II details the 1995
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Pace University School of Law. M.A. Criminal Jus-
tice, 2005, John Jay College of Criminal Justice. B.S. Criminal Justice, summa
cum laude, 2003, Pace University. The author wishes to thank her family and
friends, for helping and supporting her through law school. She could not have
done any of this without them. This comment is dedicated to the loving memory of
Brandy Heller.
1. See Edward J. Maggio, The Turbulent History of New York's Death Penalty,
77 N.Y. ST. B.J. 11 (2005).
2. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Consol. 2006).
3. Id. § 400.27(10), invalidated by People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y.
2004).
4. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 365.
5. See Joseph Goldstein, Death Penalty May Be Revived by High Court, N.Y.
SuN, Nov. 17, 2006, at N.Y.1 [hereinafter Goldstein, Death Penalty May Be
Revived].
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New York death penalty statute. Section III discusses People v.
LaValle and its impact on New York death penalty jurispru-
dence. Section IV looks at the aftermath of the LaValle deci-
sion, the actions taken in New York to renew the death penalty,
and the case of People v. Taylor.6 Section V contains specula-
tion about the future of the death penalty in New York as well
as views on the use of the death penalty as a form of
punishment.
I: The History of the Death Penalty in New York
New York State began utilizing the death penalty in the
early colonial days. While under Dutch control, New York had
a harsh death penalty.7 However, the Dutch did not have an
"organized" legal system to mete out this punishment.8 Some-
times, if the criminal court could not determine the culprit in a
particular crime, men would draw lots to determine who would
be executed.9
The British brought to New York an organized legal sys-
tem, which included capital punishment as a possible sanc-
tion. 10 Several penal law offenses carried with them the death
penalty.1 However, there was a popular practice of pardoning
individuals as long as they agreed to leave the colony or enlist
in the army.12 Despite one bloody period in 1741, where eigh-
teen white colonials and thirteen slaves were burned at the
stake, the eighteenth century saw 51.7 percent of condemned
defendants given some form of pardon or mercy.' 3
The creation of the United States of America led to an
evolution in the legal system in New York State. In 1888, the
New York State legislature passed a new capital punishment
6. People v. Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129 (2007).
7. Maggio, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Id. There was a legal system; however, by current standards in the United
States, the drawing of lots to determine who would be put to death when the Dutch
criminal court could not decide exactly who committed the crime, is not organized.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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statute that required death by electricity; 14 in so doing, New
York became one of the first states to use the electric chair to
execute people condemned to death, and the first state to insti-
tutionalize a formal system where the state, not local authori-
ties, would execute individuals. 15 The statute required that
those convicted of premeditated felony, depraved murders and
other forms of homicide would face a mandatory death sen-
tence.16 William Kemmler, who had been tried, convicted and
sentenced to die for the murder of his common law wife, all
within the span of one week, became the first person in the
United States to be executed by means of the electric chair on
August 6, 1890.17 However, this new form of execution was not
as humane as was expected.' 8 Although Thomas Edison per-
sonally wired the machine and prepared it for the execution, the
first jolt of electricity failed to kill Mr. Kemmler, and he was
forced to endure a second jolt of electricity which eventually led
to his "roast[ing]" to death.19 Until the 1930s, New York exe-
cuted more prisoners than any other state.20 Overall, New York
has executed more prisoners since 1890 than any other state,
and has executed the most people later proven innocent.
21
In the 1930s, legislators amended the death penalty statute
to increase the number of crimes for which a defendant could be
death eligible, including the crime of kidnapping, where the vic-
tim was not produced alive by the time the trial commenced. 2
2
The change to allow this particular type of kidnapping was in-
fluenced by the Lindbergh kidnapping, because although New
Jersey was able to attain a conviction for first degree murder
without the body, New York required proof of a murder in the
form of a body in order to attain a conviction. 23 Additionally,
14. Id. See also Michael Lumer & Nancy Tenney, The Death Penalty in New
York: An Historical Perspective, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 81, 83-84 (1995).
15. Maggio, supra note 1, at 12; Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at 84.
16. Maggio, supra note 1, at 12.
17. Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at 85-86.
18. See id. at 86-87.
19. Id.
20. Maggio, supra note 1, at 12; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
87.
21. Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at 82.
22. Maggio, supra note 1, at 12; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
89-90.
23. Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at 90.
20081 591
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the amended statute allowed juries to make sentencing recom-
mendations for a defendant convicted of a death eligible crime.24
Despite a greater number of crimes carrying the death penalty,
executions in New York decreased throughout the 1940s and
1950s. 25 From 1950 until 1962, the legislature introduced a bill
to abolish the death penalty every year.26 The New York State
legislature amended the death penalty statute in 1963.27 The
statute no longer required mandatory imposition of the death
penalty for premeditated killings and made the jury's sentenc-
ing recommendations binding on the court.2 The 1963 statute
provided more protection for defendants by ensuring that those
under eighteen would not be subject to capital punishment. Ad-
ditionally, the statute allowed judges to dismiss a jury and sen-
tence the defendant to prison if he or she found mitigating
circumstances. 29 Bifurcated trials, those in which the guilt and
punishment phases of the trial are separated, were also em-
ployed through the 1963 amendments. 30 In 1963, Eddie Lee
Mays became the last person executed in New York State.31 In
1965, legislators again amended the statute limiting the death
penalty to the deliberate and premeditated murder of police of-
ficers killed in the line of duty or for convicted prisoners serving
a life sentence who killed a fellow inmate.32 In 1967, the legisla-
ture again expanded the class of crimes punishable by death,
including felony murder.33
The face of death penalty legislation changed when the Su-
preme Court announced its ruling in Furman v. Georgia.34 The
24. Maggio, supra note 1, at 12.
25. Id.; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at 91.
26. Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at 91-92.
27. Id. See also Maggio, supra note 1, at 13.
28. Maggio, supra note 1, at 13; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
92.
29. Maggio, supra note 1, at 13; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
92.
30. Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at 92-93.
31. Maggio, supra note 1, at 13; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
92.
32. Maggio, supra note 1, at 14; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
93-94.
33. Maggio, supra note 1, at 14; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
94.
34. 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (holding that the application of the Georgia death
penalty statute violates cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and
592 [Vol. 28:589
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effect of the decision in Furman made unconstitutional any
death penalty statute that granted jury members unregulated
discretion.35 Furman forced the New York Court of Appeals to
rule the death penalty statute unconstitutional because it did
not regulate the discretion of the jury.36 In the wake of
Furman, legislatures did not know how to craft their death pen-
alty statutes to conform to the Supreme Court's opinion, result-
ing in a moratorium on the death penalty in New York.37 The
Supreme Court finally approved death penalty statutes in
1976.38 From 1978 until 1994, the Governor vetoed any newly
proposed death penalty legislation.39
II: The 1995 New York Death Penalty Statute
After decades without a death penalty statute, the election
of a new Republican Governor, George Pataki, heralded a new
era in death penalty legislation in New York.40 The New York
State legislature passed death penalty legislation on March 2,
1995.41 Governor George Pataki signed the act into law on
March 7, 1995, and the statute went into effect on September 1,
1995.42
Fourteenth Amendments because it was applied to minorities in a haphazard and
discriminatory manner).
35. Maggio, supra note 1, at 14; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
94.
36. People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139, 145-46 (N.Y. 1973).
37. See id. Although the opinion did not specifically create a moratorium on
the death penalty in New York, the invalidation of the New York statute, following
the Supreme Court's decision in Furman, effectively created a moratorium on the
death penalty in New York State.
38. See Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (holding Florida statute
directing the sentencing judge to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and
automatic review by state supreme court constitutional); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (ruling that new Georgia statute which focused the jury on
the crime and the particular defendant, as well as a method for oversight, was not
unconstitutional); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (declaring a Texas stat-
ute that provided for separate proceedings to determine guilt, and sentence in
which a sentencing jury could consider mitigating factors, constitutional).
39. Maggio, supra note 1, at 14; see also Lumer & Tenney, supra note 14, at
96.
40. Ian Fisher, The 1994 Election: Legislature, for Assembly and Senate, Slim
Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1994, at B6.
41. The New York Death Penalty Statute of Sept. 1, 1995 (MB) 3.
42. Id.
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The statute is divided into fourteen different parts detail-
ing the procedures for determining the sentence of a defendant
convicted of first degree murder.43 Subsection one provides that
following a conviction for first degree murder the court must
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether
to impose a sentence of life without parole or the death pen-
alty.44 Subsection two instructs the court to conduct the sen-
tencing proceeding before the same jury that determined guilt
except in extraordinary circumstances and a showing of good
cause, including but not limited to prejudice for either party.45
If such a showing is made, the court can discharge the jury and
impanel another jury to determine the sentence. 46 Additionally,
each juror is questioned to determine his/her ability to impose a
death sentence.47 If the court determines that a juror cannot
make an impartial sentencing decision, that judge should dis-
charge the juror and replace him/her with an alternate if one is
available; 48 if no alternate is available, the entire jury must be
discharged and a new one impaneled. 49 Subsection four allows
the court, or either party, the ability to motion for a delay of the
sentencing proceeding. 50 Subsection eight provides both sides
with the opportunity to rebut any evidence presented at the
sentencing proceeding. 51  Subsection five notes that a
presentence investigation is not needed unless the court will be
imposing a sentence of imprisonment. 52
Subsections three, six and seven provide guidance on the
use and definition of aggravating factors. 53 The only aggravat-
ing factors a jury may consider are those which were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.5 4 The aggravating factors
cannot be relitigated during the sentencing proceeding. 55 Sub-
43. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Consol. 2006).
44. Id. § 400.27(1).
45. Id. § 400.27(2).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 400.27(4).
51. Id. § 400.27(8).
52. Id. § 400.27(5).
53. Id. § 400.27.
54. Id. § 400.27(3).
55. Id. § 400.27(6).
[Vol. 28:589
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section seven is divided into three different parts.56 Part 7(a)
permits the people to prove that in the ten years prior to the
commission of the murder for which the defendant was con-
victed, the defendant was convicted of two or more specified of-
fenses, including certain class A or class B felonies, 57 or crimes
in another state that are punishable by more than one year and
involve the threat or use of a deadly weapon or the attempt or
infliction of serious physical injury or death.58 This is impor-
tant because the conviction of two or more of these specified of-
fenses, if proven, constitutes an aggravating factor. 59 Part 7(b)
requires that the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt any aggravating factor under subsection seven.60 Part
7(b) allows the defendant to present evidence regarding the ag-
gravating factor and provides each side with the opportunity for
rebuttal. 61 Part 7(c) requires the people to notify the defense of
their intention to offer evidence of an aggravating factor.62
Mitigating factors are addressed in subsections six and
nine.6 3 Subsection six requires that when the defendant
presents the mitigating factors allowed in subsection nine, the
defendant must prove those mitigating factors by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 64 Additionally, the people can only present
evidence in rebuttal of a mitigating factor.65 Subsection nine
details the mitigating factors of which a defendant may present
evidence.66 These mitigating factors include: (a) the defendant
has no prior criminal history involving use of violence towards
another person; (b) the defendant was mentally retarded at the
time of the crime or was mentally impaired to the extent that
the defendant could not conform to the strictures of the law; (c)
the defendant was under duress; (d) the defendant's participa-
56. Id. § 400.27(7).
57. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (Consol. 2006) (noting that class A felonies re-
quire life imprisonment and class B felonies allow the court to fix a term that shall
not exceed 25 years).
58. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(7) (Consol. 2006).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 400.27.
64. Id. § 400.27(6).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 400.27(9).
2008] 595
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tion was minor; (e) the defendant committed the murder under
the influence of drugs or alcohol; and (f) any other circumstance
about the crime or the defendant that would be relevant to
mitigation. 67
Subsection ten involves the jury instruction which the New
York Court of Appeals later invalidated. 68 Subsection ten pro-
vides for summation at the end of the sentencing proceeding,
which the people commence and the defendant ends. 69 Follow-
ing summation, the judge instructs the jury that they may con-
sider whether or not a sentence of death or life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole should be imposed for each
count of first degree murder. 70 The judge then informs the jury
that they must come to a unanimous conclusion on any sentence
and that failure to do so will result in the imposition of a sen-
tence of a minimum of twenty to twenty-five years imprison-
ment to a maximum of life imprisonment.71
Subsection eleven focuses on the jury's deliberations. 72 The
jury can only impose a death sentence if they unanimously find
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating . . . factors
substantially outweigh the mitigating ... factors."73 The jury
must specify which aggravating and mitigating factors it con-
sidered in rendering its decision. 74 The court can direct the jury
to stop deliberating on the sentence if the jury deliberated for a
long period of time without coming to a unanimous decision and
if the court thinks that unanimity will not result in a reasona-
ble time period.75 If the jury unanimously decides to sentence
the defendant to death, the court must impose a death sen-
tence. 76 However, the defendant may motion to set aside the
death sentence. 77 Should the jury unanimously determine to
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment, the court must im-
67. Id.
68. Id. § 400.27(10); see People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).
69. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10) (Consol. 2006).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 400.27(11).
73. Id. § 400.27(11)(a).
74. Id. § 400.27(11)(b).
75. Id. § 400.27(11)(c). The statute does not specify how long the jury may
deliberate before the court directs them to cease deliberations.
76. Id. § 400.27(11)(d).
77. Id.
596 [Vol. 28:589
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pose that sentence on the defendant. 78 When the jury delivers
its sentence the court must ask the jurors as a collective unit
whether they concur with the sentence. 79 Both parties have the
option to individually poll the jurors to ensure that they agree
with the sentence announced.80 If a juror does not agree with
the sentence the jury must return to deliberations.8 ' As long as
no disagreements exist, the judge must discharge the jury.8 2
Subsections twelve through fourteen detail the process the
court must go through if the defendant establishes that he/she
has a mental retardation.83
The new statute was not without criticism,8 4 most of which
focused on the subsection directing the judge to instruct the
jury that should they fail to come to a unanimous decision on
either death or life imprisonment, the law required the judge to
sentence the defendant to a minimum of twenty to twenty-five
years in prison with a maximum of life imprisonment.8 5 This
deadlock instruction was unique among state death penalty
statutes.8 6 "The Committee believes that this sentencing
scheme is illogical and creates the possibility of a coerced ver-
dict of death."87 The complaint centers on the fact that if the
jury fails to come to a unanimous decision, the judge will sen-
tence the defendant to a third possible sentence that the jury
could not even consider.8 This raised fears that the instruction
would coerce a jury to come to a unanimous decision, even if
they did not truly agree, because of a belief that the alternative
sentence would be too lenient since it included the possibility of
parole.8 9 Furthermore, critics believed that since the legisla-
ture did not directly provide the jury with the sentencing choice
78. Id. § 400.27(11)(e).
79. Id. § 400.27(11)(f).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 400.27(12-14).
84. See GERARD P. CONROY ET. AL., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
THE DEATH PENALTY OF THE NEW YORK CouNTY LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION ON NEW
YORK'S DEATH PENALTY ACT, ENACTED MARCH 7, 1995, at 22 (1996). See also Mag-
gio, supra note 1, at 15.
85. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10) (Consol. 2006).
86. Maggio, supra note 1, at 15.
87. CONROY, supra note 84, at 22.
88. Id.
89. Id.
20081 597
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
of imprisonment with the possibility of parole, the legislature
must not have believed in the appropriateness of such a sen-
tence. 90 Many believed that since most Senators probably
would not consider a sentence which included the possibility of
parole sufficient punishment for a murderer, the only possible
purpose of allowing the judge to impose such a sentence would
be to coerce the jury into coming to a unanimous verdict.91
The New York State Legislature was aware of the coercive
danger of the statute.92 Senator Richard Dollinger asked:
[H]ow do you avoid the problem of a jury that is hung up on the
issue of either life in prison without parole or the death penalty of
putting additional pressure on the jurors, knowing that if they
failed to agree they are going to face a penalty that is less than
either of the two penalties that they are currently in dispute
over?93
Senator Dale Volker expressed his feeling that the statute
did not have a coercive effect.94 Senator Dollinger wanted to
know if the Senate considered providing the jury with all three
options on which to deliberate. 95 Senator Volker said the Sen-
ate considered this, but they decided to let the jury decide be-
tween the most severe penalties. 96
III: People v. LaValle
The State of New York charged Stephen S. LaValle with
the first degree murder of Cynthia Quinn in furtherance of first
degree rape.97 Cynthia Quinn's body was found in some woods
near her home in Suffolk County covered with seventy-three
screw-driver like puncture wounds and various bruises and
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 359 (N.Y. 2004).
93. Id. (quoting New York State Senate Debate, Transcripts 1912 (Mar. 6,
1995) (Statement of Senator Dollinger)).
94. Id. at 359-60 (citing New York State Senate Debate, Transcripts 1912
(Mar. 6, 1995) (Statement of Senator Volker)).
95. Id. at 360 (citing New York State Senate Debate, Transcripts 1912 (Mar.
6, 1995) (Statement of Senator Dollinger)).
96. Id. (citing New York State Senate Debate, Transcripts 1912 (Mar. 6, 1995)
(Statement of Senator Volker)).
97. Id. at 344.
598 [Vol. 28:589
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abrasions. 98 She had been raped. 99 On the same morning of the
murder, a man who bumped into Monique Sturm's car attacked
and robbed her.100 Ms. Sturm provided a description of her at-
tacker, but even more importantly, the police found her wallet
near the scene of the murder.1 1 The police suspected Mr.
LaValle in the robbery of Ms. Sturm as well as an earlier attack
and arrested him two days after the murder.10 2 After denying
any involvement in either crime he eventually admitted that he
was involved in a car accident with Ms. Sturm and confessed to
the murder of Cynthia Quinn.10 3
After his conviction, Mr. LaValle appealed directly to the
New York Court of Appeals. 10 4 Mr. LaValle appealed on several
different grounds, including failure to dismiss certain jurors,
failure to provide new counsel, and the unconstitutionality of
the deadlock instruction provided by the statute.10 5 The chal-
lenge to the deadlock instruction proved the key element of this
case.
The LaValle court noted that the New York deadlock in-
struction, requiring the jury to be informed that the judge
would impose a third more lenient sentence if the jury could not
unanimously decide on the sentence, is unique among state
death penalty statutes. 0 6 The People contended that the New
York deadlock provision was similar to a provision upheld by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Ramseur.10 7 The
LaValle court distinguished the New Jersey provision since it
was amended in 2000 and now mandated an instruction to the
jury that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict would result in
a sentence of life without parole. 08 The LaValle court com-
pared the deadlock instruction used in this case to that mistak-
enly given in Morris v. Woodford.10 9 In Morris, the Ninth
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 345.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 344.
105. Id. at 346, 348, 356.
106. Id. at 357.
107. Id. at 357 n.10 (citing State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 358 (citing Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2001)).
2008] 599
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that the coercive instruction given
to the jury led to the reasonable possibility that members of the
jury might believe that failure to sentence the defendant to ei-
ther death or life imprisonment without parole would result in a
sentence of life with parole. The Ninth Circuit thus remanded
the case for a new penalty phase without the impermissibly co-
ercive instruction.110
The LaValle court cited a number of studies that found that
jurors' misperceptions about the effect of prison sentences affect
their determination to impose a sentence of death."' Jurors
tend to "grossly underestimate how long capital murderers not
sentenced to death usually stay in prison.11 2 The "sooner ju-
rors think a defendant will be released from prison, the more
likely they are to vote for death and the more likely they are to
see the defendant as dangerous.11 3 A South Carolina study
came to the same conclusion noting that "jurors who believe the
alternative to death is a relatively short time in prison tend to
sentence [the defendant] to death. Jurors who believe the alter-
native treatment is longer tend to sentence to life." 1 4 The
LaValle court felt that the deadlock instruction encouraged the
jury to sentence the defendant to death because of their fears
that the defendant may be released on parole and once again
pose a danger to the general population. 115 This concerned the
court since the jury may not consider future dangerousness as
an aggravating factor; yet it inevitably becomes part of the
jury's consideration when determining a sentence." 6
The LaValle court noted that the United States Supreme
Court never ruled on an instruction which tells jurors that if
they cannot agree on a verdict the defendant will receive a
110. Id. (citing Morris, 273 F.3d at 841).
111. Id. at 357-59 (citing William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By
Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sen-
tencing, 77 TEx. L. REV. 605 (1999); William J. Bowers, Symposium: The Capital
Jury Project: The Capital Jury Project Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly
Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993)).
112. Id. (citing Bowers & Steiner, supra note 111, at 648).
113. Id. (citing Bowers & Steiner, supra note 111, at 703).
114. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 111, at 7.
115. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 357-58.
116. Id. at 358.
600 [Vol. 28:589
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lesser sentence than those they considered. 117 However, the Su-
preme Court has held that defendants are entitled to uncoerced
verdicts. 118 Two Supreme Court cases provided some support
for the LaValle court's analysis." 9 In Simmons, the Court held
that "[t]he State may not create a false dilemma by advancing
generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dan-
gerousness while, at the same time, preventing the jury from
learning that the defendant never will be released on parole." 20
In Beck, the Supreme Court invalidated the state's death pen-
alty scheme, which did not allow the jurors to convict a defen-
dant of a lesser included offense, because it enhanced the risk of
an unwarranted conviction. 12' The Supreme Court held that
the statute "interjects irrelevant considerations into the fact
finding process."1 22 The LaValle court believed that the reason-
ing of Beck applied to this case despite the fact that Beck in-
volved the guilt phase of the trial. 123 The court reasoned that
precluding the jury from considering a third option, yet in-
structing the jury that the third option would be imposed
should they fail to come to a unanimous sentencing decision,
improperly interjects future dangerousness into the jury's delib-
erations. 24 The only problem lay in that the Supreme Court in
California v. Ramos held that "the risk of an unwarranted con-
viction is simply not directly translatable" to the penalty phase
of a capital trial. 25 However, the California Supreme Court
subsequently held the instruction to the jury at issue in Califor-
nia v. Ramos 26 unconstitutional because it was misleading and
allowed the jury to consider other impermissible factors. 27 The
LaValle court approved of the language used in State v. White:
117. Id. at 360.
118. Id. (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)).
119. Id. at 360-61 (citing Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)).
120. Id. (citing Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171).
121. Id. (citing Beck, 447 U.S. at 637).
122. Id. (citing Beck, 447 U.S. at 642).
123. Id. at 361.
124. Id.
125. 463 U.S. 992, 1009 (1983).
126. Id. at 995-96 (instructing the jury that a life sentence without parole
could be commuted by the Governor).
127. People v. Ramos, 689 P.2d 430, 444 (Cal. 1984).
2008] 601
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It is no more proper for a jury to conclude that death be the pen-
alty because a life sentence may be commuted or the defendant
paroled, than it would be for a trial judge in other criminal causes
deliberately to impose an excessive sentence to frustrate the stat-
utory scheme committing parole to another agency. That death
should be inflicted when a life sentence is appropriate is an abhor-
rent thought. 128
The LaValle court used the Ramos and White cases to de-
termine the unconstitutionality of the deadlock instruction. 129
The court reasoned that the Due Process Clause of the New
York State Constitution 130 required them to strike down the
deadlock instruction because it created a substantial risk of co-
ercing jurors into sentencing a defendant to death.' 31
The LaValle court then addressed the possibility of elimi-
nating the instruction. 32 The court considered allowing the ab-
sence of an instruction because of the Supreme Court ruling in
Jones v. United States. 33 In Jones, the defendant requested
that the judge provide the jury with an instruction about the
consequences of their failure to come to a unanimous decision,
namely that the judge would impose a sentence of life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole. 34 The Supreme Court
ruled that the Eighth Amendment 35 does not require that a
jury in a capital punishment case be informed of the conse-
quences of their failure to come to a unanimous agreement. 136
The LaValle court declined to adopt the ruling from Jones, find-
ing that the Due Process Clause of the New York State Consti-
tution demands a higher standard than the Federal
Constitution. 137 The court concluded that the absence of an in-
struction was no better than the current unconstitutional in-
struction. 38 "[T]he absence of an instruction would lead to
death sentences that are based on speculation, as the Legisla-
128. State v. White, 142 A.2d 65, 76 (N.J. 1958).
129. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 361.
130. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
131. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 365.
132. Id. at 365-67.
133. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
134. Id. at 379.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
136. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 381.
137. Id. at 365-66.
138. Id.
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ture apparently feared when it decided to prescribe the instruc-
tion."139 Without an instruction the jury might still worry that
the failure to come to a unanimous verdict would lead to a re-
trial, a lesser sentence or the defendant's release. 140
The LaValle court noted that they were not alone in deter-
mining that a jury instruction relating to the consequences of a
deadlock is required in all capital cases. 141 Three states' 42 made
such a determination by court rule. 43 Five states'" made the
determination through legislative enactment. 145 The LaValle
court relied on the court rulings in Delaware, Louisiana and
New Jersey. 46 In State v. Williams, the Louisiana Supreme
Court considered the question of whether a trial judge must in-
form the jury that their failure to come to a unanimous decision
would lead to the imposition of a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. 147 The Williams court determined that the
failure to provide the jury with an explanatory instruction re-
garding the consequences of their failure to come to a unani-
mous decision "created a substantial risk that [death] would be
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.' 48 In Whalen
v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware determined that "fail-
ure to provide the jury with accurate, explicit instructions was a
substantial denial of the defendant's constitutional rights." 49
In State v. Ramseur, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
there is a "constitutional imperative in a capital case that jurors
be made to understand the ultimate consequences of their
decision." 50
Although the LaValle court found that a deadlock instruc-
tion could not be omitted, it declined to draft a deadlock instruc-
139. Id. at 365.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 367.
142. The three states were Delaware, Louisiana and New Jersey.
143. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 367.
144. The five states included Idaho, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania and
Wyoming.
145. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 367.
146. See id.
147. State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 619, 633 (La. 1980).
148. Id. at 635.
149. Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del. 1985).
150. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 283 (N.J. 1987).
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tion which would meet constitutional requirements.' 5 ' The
court claimed that it did not have the power to change the stat-
ute, especially since it believed that the only way to craft a new
statute would be to impose a greater sentence than that already
provided for. 5 2 Therefore, the LaValle court concluded that the
death penalty could not be imposed under the current stat-
ute. 153 Thus, the court vacated Mr. LaValle's death sentence
and remanded the case to the lower court for resentencing. 54
The dissent in LaValle believed that the deadlock instruc-
tion provision was not coercive, and even if it was it could be
severed from the rest of the statute to make the statute enforce-
able.' 5 5 In fact, the dissent stated that the consequences of a
deadlock should not be part of the jury's considerations. 56 The
dissent noted that only eight of the thirty-seven states currently
utilizing capital punishment provide for an anticipatory dead-
lock instruction;157 furthermore, none of these states have held
the deadlock instruction necessary as a matter of due process. 15
The dissent cites Jones, the case which the majority decided to
ignore, to support their contention that an anticipatory dead-
lock instruction need not be provided to the jury.' 59 As for the
failure to craft a new statute, the dissent contends that the ma-
jority is essentially telling the legislature that the only death
penalty statute that will pass constitutional muster is one
which informs the jury that a failure to reach a unanimous deci-
sion would result in a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.' 60 Therefore, the dissent states that the re-
fusal to craft a new statute is merely illusory because the major-
ity has essentially crafted a new statute. 16'
151. See LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 367.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 368.
155. Id. at 369 (R.S. Smith, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 370.
157. Id. at 377.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 378 (citing Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999) (hold-
ing that the Eighth Amendment does not require a capital jury to be informed of
the consequences of their failure to come to a unanimous decision)).
160. Id. at 380.
161. See id.
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IV: The Aftermath of People v. LaValle and People v. Taylor
Following LaValle, the death sentences of convicted mur-
derers Nicholson McCoy and Robert Schulman were over-
turned.162 Only John Taylor remained on death row. 163 John
Taylor's conviction occurred after the decision in LaValle.164
John Taylor was convicted of the execution style murder of five
employees at a Wendy's restaurant in Queens. 65 Taylor, along
with his mildly retarded accomplice, bound, blindfolded, gagged
and shot seven employees at the restaurant; two employees sur-
vived. 66 In Taylor's case, the judge was aware of the contro-
versy surrounding the deadlock instruction and therefore
changed his charge to the jury. 167 The judge informed the jury
that if they did not reach a unanimous decision as to sentenc-
ing, the defendant would be sentenced to prison and eligible for
parole in 175 years. 68 Presumably, the judge felt that this
would alleviate the jury's fear that the defendant would be re-
leased quickly and pose more danger to the public.
John Taylor's execution was not a foregone conclusion
merely because the judge provided different instructions to the
jury. Following his conviction and sentencing, Taylor appealed
to the New York Court of Appeals, the same court which de-
cided LaValle.169 After some delay, oral arguments took place
in the fall of 2007.170 The Queens prosecutor argued that the
court should overturn LaValle. 171 The prosecutor also claimed
that in cases like Taylor's, where the judge informs the jurors
that it is unlikely that the defendant will ever be released from
prison, any resulting death penalty convictions should be up-
held because the concerns in LaValle have been met. 172 Taylor's
attorneys argued that they believed the only way to execute
162. Maggio, supra note 1, at 16.
163. Goldstein, Death Penalty May Be Revived, supra note 5.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. For a more complete transcript of the instruction given, see People v.
Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129, 143-145 (2007).
169. People v. Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129 (2007).
170. Joseph Goldstein, Appeals Court Likely Split on Death Penalty Law, N.Y.
SuN, Sep. 11, 2007, at N.Y.2 [hereinafter Goldstein, Appeals Court Likely Split].
171. Id.
172. Id.
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their client was to overturn LaValle.173 Furthermore, Susan
Salomon, an attorney for Taylor, stated that "[y]ou can't have a
death penalty of one, simply for John Taylor."174 Prior to any
decision being handed down, Taylor's case was believed to be
important because "[i]f the court gets past the sentencing issue,
Hutter [chairman of the board of New York's Capital Defender
Office] said, 'then they have to address directly ... whether the
death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. ' 1 75
When the Court of Appeals heard the case of John Taylor,
the makeup of the court was different; 76 some speculated that
this difference could be influential on the outcome of the case. 77
Judge George Bundy Smith, who wrote the opinion in
LaValle,178 retired from the court in 2006.179 Some people argue
that Judge Smith's decision in LaValle cost him a chance at a
second fourteen year term on the Court of Appeals. 80 Governor
Pataki appointed Eugene Pigott, Jr. to fill the vacancy.' 8 '
Judge Pigott has been described as a moderate with close ties to
the Republican party. 8 2 Judge Rosenblatt, who wrote a concur-
ring opinion in LaValle, retired from the bench in late 2006.183
Eliot Spitzer, elected Governor in November 2006, had the re-
sponsibility of appointing a judge to replace Judge Rosen-
blatt 8 4 Governor Spitzer appointed Theodore T. Jones, Jr.,
who had served in Brooklyn for seventeen years to take the seat
vacated by Judge Rosenblatt.18 5 Chief Judge Kaye, who con-
curred in Judge Bundy Smith's opinion, was also up for a new
term;18 6 however, Governor Spitzer reappointed her to another
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Tom Precious, Pigott May Provide Swing Vote on 2 Major Cases, BUFFALO
NEWS, Sept. 16, 2006, at D1.
176. See Goldstein, Death Penalty May Be Revived, supra note 5.
177. Id.
178. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. 2004).
179. Goldstein, Death Penalty May Be Revived, supra note 5.
180. National Headliners, JET, Sept. 11, 2006, at Ticker Tape 14.
181. Precious, supra note 175.
182. Id.
183. Goldstein, Death Penalty May Be Revived, supra note 5.
184. Id.
185. Sewell Chan, Spitzer Selects a Black Jurist for Top Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2007, at B1.
186. See Goldstein, Death Penalty May Be Revived, supra note 5.
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term which will end in 2008 when she reaches the mandatory
retirement age of 70.187
The Court of Appeals decided Taylor on October 23, 2007.188
In an opinion written by Judge Ciparick, the plurality stood be-
hind the idea of stare decisis and overturned Mr. Taylor's death
sentence.18 9 "Hence, both the legitimacy and the ability of the
judiciary to function dictate that legal issues that have been ad-
dressed by a jurisdiction should not be revisited every time they
arise." 90 The plurality again noted that it is the role of the leg-
islature to redraft a statute, and that the "trial court's remaking
of an unconstitutional statute into a new statute" could not be
condoned.' 91 The court reasoned that allowing the trial judge to
craft his own statute would undermine the system of checks and
balances.192 Ultimately, the court determined that they were
not wrong in LaValle, and that they were in the same position
they were in three years ago: with a facially unconstitutional
death penalty statute, which could only be changed by the
legislature.
Although he joined the plurality, Judge Robert S. Smith
wrote a separate concurring opinion. 93 Smith was among those
who dissented in LaValle.194 Judge Smith noted that there
were two central holdings in LaValle; namely that the anticipa-
tory deadlock instruction was unconstitutional, and that only
the legislature can amend the statute.195 No one asked the
court to overturn the holding in LaValle regarding the unconsti-
tutionality of the statute. 196 The court was asked by an amicus,
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, to overturn the second
holding of LaValle, that only the legislature could redraft the
statute. However, everyone on the court, except Smith, ignored
187. Anne Miller, Chief Judge is Seeking a New Term; Judith Kaye Told
Spitzer She Wants to Finish Reform Projects Says Law Journal, THE TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), Nov. 11, 2006, at A3; Sen. Montgomery Lauds Chief Judge Judith
Kaye's Reappointment to Bench, HT MEDIA LTD., Mar. 19, 2007.
188. People v. Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129 (2007).
189. Id. at 155-56.
190. Id. at 148.
191. Id. at 153.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 156 (R.S. Smith, J., concurring).
194. See supra notes 155-161.
195. Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d at 156 (R.S. Smith, J., concurring).
196. Id.
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that request, while Smith wrote his concurrence to address this
issue.197 Judge Smith expressed his opinion that LaValle was
wrong in holding that the statute could not be read without the
deadlock instruction and needed to be rewritten entirely. 198
However, he also believed that the harm done by this error does
not justify ignoring stare decisis. 199 Furthermore, the court in
LaValle made it perfectly clear that the legislature could re-
draft the statute to comply with the ruling in the case and
therefore any wrong made by the error in LaValle could be
ameliorated. 200
The dissent noted that the instruction at issue in Taylor
was non-coercive. 20' Judge Read noted that she still believed
that LaValle was wrongly decided; however in Taylor, she ac-
cepted the holding as binding precedent under stare decisis.20 2
However, she firmly dissented on the grounds that the majority
in Taylor "convert[ed]" the closing comment in LaValle into a
holding in this case that the death penalty statute was facially
unconstitutional.20 3 Judge Read stated that there was no dis-
cussion of facial constitutionality in the entire LaValle opin-
ion.20 4 Furthermore, the dissent argued that there is nothing in
the statute that prevented the trial judge from giving the in-
struction required by the statute and explaining the implica-
tions to the jury.20 5 Therefore, the instruction given to the
defendant's jury ensured that the deadlock instruction at issue
in LaValle was constitutionally applied to John Taylor.20 6 The
dissent also noted that the legislature included a severability
provision in the death penalty statute, which made it clear that
the legislature preferred a judicially redesigned statute over not
having one at all.20 7 Therefore, the dissent believed that there
was no reason why John Taylor's death sentence should be va-
cated, when he received a non-coercive instruction seemingly al-
197. Id.
198. Id. at 157.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 160 (S.P. Read, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 163-64.
203. Id. at 164.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 166.
206. Id. at 167.
207. Id. at 171.
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lowed by the statute, merely because Stephen LaValle received
a coercive instruction. 208
The legislature did not take much action after the decision
in LaValle.20 9 In late 2005, the legislature approved an aggra-
vated assault charge designed to deter assaults of police, peace
and corrections officers. 210 However, one case has made the
Legislature rethink their decision to take no action relating to
the deadlock instruction.21' The state tried Anthony Horton in
2006 for the murder of New York State Trooper Andrew J.
Sperr on March 1, 2006.212 Bryan Adams, Horton's accomplice
in a bank robbery that occurred minutes before the murder, tes-
tified at Horton's trial.21 3 Adams testified that Horton told him
he would shoot Trooper Sperr when the Trooper approached the
vehicle. People in the courtroom were really alarmed when Ad-
ams testified: "Tony said, 'Do you want to do a little bit of
(prison) time or a lot of time?' He said he was going to shoot the
cop. He said New York doesn't have a death penalty."21 4 State
Senator George H. Winner, a supporter of restoring the death
penalty, said, "I found that to be some of the most astonishing
testimony I've ever heard about. I've been for years listening to
opponents that no empirical evidence exists that the death pen-
alty ever acted as a deterrent to murder. This testimony is a
stark rebuke to that continuing argument. '215 The jury con-
victed Horton of all charges filed against him, including aggra-
vated murder, an offense carrying a mandatory sentence of life
in prison without parole. 21 6 The murders of other law enforce-
ment officers in the line of duty also spurred the call for re-
newed death penalty legislation.217
208. Id. at 175.
209. See The Legislature's Verdict, STAR-GAZETTE (Elmira, N.Y.), Oct. 1, 2006,
at 12A [hereinafter The Legislature's Verdict].
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Jeffrey Murray, Capital Punishment Debate Heats Up, STAR-GAZETTE
(Elmira, N.Y.), Oct. 28, 2006, at 1C.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Assembly Minority Pushes Death Penalty for Cop Killers, HT MEDIA LTD.,
Mar. 29, 2006.
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The State Senate proposed legislation amending section
400.27.218 The proposed changes to section 400.27 are as
follows:
In its charge, the court must instruct the jury that with respect to
each count of murder in the first degree the jury should consider
whether or not a sentence of death should be imposed and
whether or not a sentence of life imprisonment without parole
should be imposed and whether or not a sentence to a term of
imprisonment with a minimum term of between twenty and
twenty five years, to be determined by the court, and a maximum
term of life imprisonment should be imposed. (b) The court must
instruct the jury that the jury must be unanimous with respect to
the sentence to be imposed. The court must also instruct the jury
that in the event the jury fails to reach unanimous agreement
with respect to the sentence, the court will sentence the defendant
to a term of life imprisonment without parole.219
Under the new bill, the jury can make a sentencing deter-
mination among three different choices: (1) a sentence of life im-
prisonment without parole, (2) a sentence with a mandatory
minimum and maximum, and (3) a sentence of death.220 There-
fore, the indeterminate sentence under which the unconstitu-
tional deadlock provision could be imposed only by the judge,
should the jury fail to reach a unanimous decision, is now an
option for the jury to consider.2 21 The new bill is different in
that a failure of the jury to reach a unanimous verdict will re-
sult in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 222 The
New York State Senate approved the bill by a vote of 37-23, and
passed it up to the New York State Assembly. 223 However, the
assembly has taken no action on that bill.224 In fact, it seems
unlikely that the assembly will approve new death penalty leg-
islation any time soon.225
218. S. S2727, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
219. Id.
220. The Legislature's Verdict, supra note 209.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Murray, supra note 212.
225. Goldstein, Appeals Court Likely Split, supra note 170.
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V: The Future of the Death Penalty in New York
Any speculation about the future of the death penalty in
New York is just that, mere speculation. There is no way to
know what the future will hold. However, the 2006 elections
may provide some guidance. Democrats essentially swept all
statewide elections. 226 Although Spitzer supports the death
penalty for cop killers and terrorists,227 he appointed judges to
the New York Court of Appeals, like Judge Kaye, who have not
shown support for the death penalty.228 With Governor
Spitzer's resignation, David Paterson became Governor of New
York.229 Unlike Governor Spitzer, Governor Paterson fully op-
poses the death penalty. 230
Through the decision in LaValle, New York joined a couple
of states in instituting a moratorium on the death penalty. 231
Thirteen states and the District of Columbia do not have the
death penalty as a form of punishment.232 Furthermore, even
though the majority of states maintain death penalty legisla-
tion, the number of death sentences has decreased over the
years from 300 in 1998 to 143 in 2003.233 In April 1999, the
United Nations Human Rights Commission passed the Resolu-
tion Supporting Worldwide Moratorium on Executions, which
seeks to encourage countries retaining the death penalty to re-
226. Danny Hakim, Thorny Issue Faces Spitzer in Day-After Pleasantries,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at P5.
227. Danny Hakim, A Gilded Path to Political Stardom, With Detours, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at Al.
228. See Goldstein, Death Penalty May Be Revived, supra note 5.
229. Nicholas Confessore & Jeremy W. Peters, A Day That Shook the State,
and Hinted at a Resolution to Come, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at B1.
230. Id.
231. Bob Egelko, State's Execution Method on Trial; Judge to Decide if Injec-
tion is Constitutional - May Order Changes in Procedure, Training, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 25, 2006, at Al.
232. Death Penalty Information Center, Death Penalty Policy State by State,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?did=121&scid=ll (last visited Feb. 7,
2008) (The thirteen states include Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia and Wisconsin. New York is also listed, but since New York is the subject
of this article and the death penalty has not been officially repealed by the legisla-
ture, it is not included in this count.).
233. Death Penalty Information Center, Part II: History of the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 15&did=41 1#CurrentConditions
inCapitalPunishment (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
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strict its use. 234 However, the United States voted against the
resolution.235
New York's neighboring state, New Jersey, recently took
action to end the institution of the death penalty in the state.236
New Jersey had reinstated the death penalty twenty-five years
ago and even built a lethal injection chamber at the New Jersey
State Prison.237 However, New Jersey never utilized the rein-
stated death penalty. 238 Many of the legislators who led the
way for abolishing the death penalty had in fact once been
staunch supporters of capital punishment.239 Some New Jersey
State Senators noted that they voted to abolish the death pen-
alty because some families of murder victims found the trial
process excruciating, and because the cost of appeals was astro-
nomical when one considers that most people on death row
merely died of old age in prison.240
The death penalty has been the focus of criticism on many
different levels. Among the issues discussed are cost, deter-
rence, discrimination and innocence. 241 The death penalty costs
a lot to maintain.242 In New York, the state has spent $200 mil-
lion on the death penalty system since its reinstatement in
1995.243 Other states have also noticed exorbitant costs result-
ing from the death penalty.244 Capital cases incur costs in ex-
cess of those for non-capital murder trials because different
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Jeremy W. Peters, In Ending Executions, Soul Searching, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2007, at N.J.1.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Death Penalty Information Center, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2008).
242. Death Penalty Information Center, Costs of the Death Penalty, http:l/
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=108&scid=7#financial%20facts (last visited
Feb. 7, 2008).
243. David Kaczynski, Death Penalty Should be Left Dead and Buried in New
York, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (N.Y.), Oct. 9, 2006, at 17A [hereinafter
Kaczynski, Dead and Buried].
244. See Costs of the Death Penalty and Related Issues: Hearing on the Death
Penalty in N.Y Before the Assembly Standing Comms. on Codes, Judiciary, and
Correction, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005) (statement of Richard C. Dieter, Esq.,
Executive Director of the Death Penalty Center).
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stages of the trial require more planning and take longer.245 A
study in North Carolina determined that capital punishment
cost $2.16 million per execution more than a system which em-
ployed life imprisonment. 246 Recently, a study revealed that the
death penalty cost Florida over $51 million a year more than
life imprisonment without parole. 247 In Texas, the state with
the most executions, the death penalty costs $2.3 million per
case, which equates to three times the cost of imprisoning some-
one in a cell for 40 years. 248 The death penalty costs California
residents almost $100 million per execution.249 Indiana pro-
jected that death penalty cases will cost the state 38 percent
more than life without parole sentences would. 250
Deterrence, or rather lack thereof, has been one of the ma-
jor criticisms of the death penalty.251 One of the arguments that
people make in favor of the death penalty is that the threat of
death will prevent people from committing murder because they
fear dying. From 1990 to 2004, the murder rate has declined,
while executions have increased. 252 Some people might herald
this as testamentary evidence that the death penalty works as a
deterrent, but a closer look at the figures shows that this is not
the case. 253 The murder rate in non-death penalty states is in
fact lower than that in death penalty states.254 If the death pen-
alty caused lower murder rates by deterring people from com-
mitting murder, then the murder rate should be lower in states
with the death penalty. The gap between the murder rate in
non-death penalty states and death penalty states has grown
over this time period so that in 2004 there was a 42 percent
difference between the murder rates of non-death penalty
states and death penalty states.255
245. Id.
246. Id. at 6.
247. Id. at 7.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 7-8.
251. See Death Penalty Information Center, Deterrence: States Without the
Death Penalty Have Had Consistently Lower Murder Rates, http://deathpenalty-
info.org./article.php?scid=12&did=168 (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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Discrimination is one of the hot button issues involving the
death penalty.256 One of the greatest concerns has been that
the death penalty is disproportionately applied to African
Americans. 257 A study was conducted in Philadelphia to see the
effect of race on the death penalty. 258 The study examined
murders between 1983 and 1993, which were death eligible. 259
The researchers found that "blacks in Philadelphia were sub-
stantially more likely to get the death penalty than other de-
fendants who committed similar murders. 260  African
Americans were sentenced to death at a rate nearly 40 percent
higher than other death eligible defendants. 261 The study found
that the race of the victim also had an effect on the defendant's
sentence. 262 The most likely scenario for a death sentence in-
volved an African American defendant and a victim who was
not African American. 263 The cases least likely to receive a
death sentence involved African American on African American
crimes.264 This race of victim discrepancy is a major problem
and seems to show a devaluation of the lives of African Ameri-
cans and an increased valuation of other races, particularly
whites. In many states including Florida, Oklahoma, North
Carolina and Mississippi, black defendants convicted of mur-
dering a white victim receive a death sentence at least four
times more often than they would if the victim was African
American. 265
Another major problem surrounding the death penalty is
the risk of executing an innocent person. Death is final; exoner-
ation comes too late for a dead man. More than 120 death row
inmates have been exonerated in recent years.266 New York has
256. Death Penalty Information Center, Race and the Death Penalty, http:ll
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=105&cid=5 (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
257. Id.
258. Richard C. Dieter, Esq., The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who
Lives, Who Dies, Who Decides, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&
did=539#Study%201 (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Kaczynski, Dead and Buried, supra note 243.
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experienced its own problems with convicting innocent peo-
ple.267 Recently, Jeffrey Deskovic was exonerated after serving
sixteen years in prison for a murder he did not commit.2 68 In
May of 2006, Douglas Warney was freed after spending a dec-
ade in prison for murder. 269 He was freed because his DNA did
not match that in evidence. 270 In Warney's case, the district at-
torney sought the death penalty.271 Warney was only exoner-
ated after a new district attorney agreed to retest the DNA and
found a match to someone in the criminal database. 272 Three
other men have also been exonerated in New York since Decem-
ber 2005.273
VI: Conclusion
The future of the death penalty in New York remains un-
certain. The New York Court of Appeals skirted the issue of the
constitutionality of the death penalty by relying on stare decisis
to decide the case of John Taylor. They did note that the rein-
stitution of the death penalty will not occur unless, and until,
the New York State Legislature takes some action to change the
statute previously declared unconstitutional in LaValle. If the
legislature takes no action, the moratorium that the New York
Court of Appeals instituted by their decision in LaValle will
continue. The decision by New Jersey to eradicate the death
penalty as a form of punishment in their state may have some
effect on New York. However it would be mere speculation to
contemplate what effect the actions taken by New Jersey will
have on New York. Until the legislature takes some action, the
death penalty in New York remains in limbo.
267. See id. See also David Kaczynski, New York's Death Penalty Deserves to
Die, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Oct. 5, 2006, at A13 [hereinafter Kaczynski,
Death Penalty Deserves to Die]; Laura Porter, Story Makes Case Against Death
Penalty, J. NEWS (Westchester Cty., N.Y.), Sept. 24, 2006, at 4B.
268. Kaczynski, Death Penalty Deserves to Die, supra note 267.
269. Porter, supra note 265.
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